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Chapter 12
ANALYSIS OF FORECLOSURE IN THE
EC GUIDELINES ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Steven C. Salopt
I. INTRODUCTION

The antitrust treatment of vertical restraints is quite controversial. In the
United States, for example, warring vertical restraints guidelines were issued
by the Department of Justice and National Association of Attorneys General,
a group of antitrust enforcers from the individual states. 1 However, a
consensus was never achieved and these guidelines never entered the
mainstream. Compare them to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which
have become a template for evaluation of horizontal restraints. 2
The new EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints Guidelines ("GVRs")
represent a significant effort to create and implement a consistent analytic
framework for evaluating vertical restraints.3 The scope of the project is quite
significant. The category of vertical restraints represents a broad set of
practices that raise an array of issues - efficiencies, collusion, foreclosure,
intrabrand vs. interbrand competition and so on.
In this short article, I examine the central foreclosure issues in the GVRs.
I focus mainly on the general enforcement policy, though I do discuss the
block exemption regulation at the end. I examine the GVRs through the lens
of economic analysis and the U.S. antitrust laws. I do not touch on resale price
maintenance, market allocation or franchising. Even aside from space
limitations in this article, I have chosen to focus on foreclosure because it is the

t. Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington.
1.
Department of Justice (Antitrust Division), Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 FR
6263 (February 14, 1985); Vertical Restraints As Adopted by The National Association of
Attorneys General, (1985), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,400 (1995).
2.
U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (1992, as amended in 1997, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,104. In my
own antitrust economics and law course, I spend about 20% of the classes on the horizontal
merger guidelines, using them as a vehicle to teach antitrust economics. I do not even assign
the vertical restraints guidelines, which for that matter are not included in the casebook that
I use.
3.
Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2000) (hereafter, "GVRs").
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more difficult and controversial area. For example, the recent Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines issued by the U.S. antitrust agencies did not cover
exclusion at all. 4 In contrast, the GVRs examine limited distribution, exclusive
distribution, single branding and exclusive supply in detail.
The antitrust evaluation of vertical restraints is comprised of the analysis
of procompetitive efficiency benefits and anticompetitive harms. The
efficiency benefits involve coordination of incentives and elimination of
various types of free riding. As for potential harms from exclusives, two
theories of foreclosure may be distinguished. Input foreclosure arises when
a vertical agreement requires an input supplier to sell exclusively or on more
favorable terms to one buyer, and thus discriminate in some way against
other potential buyers. Customer foreclosure arises when a contract requires
the buyer to purchase most or all of its needs of a particular product from a
single supplier. Depending on the vertical restraint, one or both of these types
of foreclosure can arise.
This article is organized as follows. Section II sets out the basic analytic
framework. Section III examines the procompetitive efficiency benefits.
Section IV examines input foreclosure and Section V examines customer
foreclosure. The limited role of competition for exclusives in constraining
foreclosure also is discussed in this section. Section VI briefly discusses the
role of exemptions based on market shares.

II. BASIC ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
The GVRs focus on agreements between manufacturers and their
wholesale and retail distributors. However, the same approach could easily
be applied to other exclusivity agreements between input suppliers and the
output producers that purchase their inputs. It also could be applied to
exclusive contracts between sellers and final consumers.
In evaluating exclusivity and foreclosure concerns, it is important to
distinguish which party is restrained by the exclusive. Consider an
"exclusive" agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor. An
"exclusivity" term in their contract could require that the manufacturer sell
only to the distributor. Alternatively, it could require that the distributor
purchase only from the manufacturer. Of course, the contract could specify
both types of exclusivity. The GVRs are concerned with both types of
exclusives. "Single branding" involves a distributor buying most or all of its
requirements from a single manufacturer. ~106. "Limited distribution"
involves a manufacturer selling only to one distributor (or one distributor in
a particular area or for resale to a particular group of customers). ~109
These different types of exclusives raise somewhat different analytic
issues. In my own work, I distinguish between two types of foreclosure

4.
US. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Conunission, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors (2000). I have drafted a preliminary set of companion
provisions to cover exclusionary conduct. S. Salop, Sample Guidelines On Exclusionary
Access Agreements By Competitor Collaborations (November 1999) (available from author).
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concerns, which I denote as "input" and "customer" foreclosure. 5 Input
foreclosure involves a situation in which an input supplier refuses to sell or
discriminates against certain buyers. ll1ose buyers are foreclosed from the
input In the manufacturer/ distributor context, this corresponds to what the
GVRs call "limited distribution." Customer foreclosure involves a situation in
which a customer refuses to buy or limits its purchases from certain sellers.
Those sellers are foreclosed from selling to the buyer.
In the
manufacturer/ distributor context, this corresponds directly to what the GVRs
call "single branding. "6
In a market economy, competitors are expected to compete. As a result,
cooperation among competitors is considered exceptional. Cooperation
among competitors can lead to reduced costs and improved products.
However, the risk of price fixing and customer allocation makes such
"horizontal" agreements inherently suspicious to antitrust enforcers and
regulators. Cooperation between sellers and buyers is the opposite. Goods
and services ca1mot be produced unless buyers and sellers cooperate in some
way, at least by transferring inputs from sellers to buyers, who then convert
those inputs into outputs that can be sold to consumers. As a result, "vertical"
agreements between suppliers and buyers are not inherently suspicious.
Antitrust analysis of vertical restraints involves the economic evaluation
and balancing of potential procompetitive benefits against potential
anticompetitive harms, in order to gauge the net competitive impact of the
restraints on consumer welfare and aggregate economic welfare. The GVRs
use the terminology "negative effects" for anticompetitive harms and "positive
effects" for procompetitive efficiency benefits.
In antitrust, this type of full competitive analysis sometimes is truncated
with permissive exemptions and safe harbors. In other situations, it is
truncated by summarily condemning the conduct with per se rules of
illegality. However, even in these situations, an ex ante balancing of benefits
and harms of the class of restraint provides the analytic foundation for these
rebuttable (or irrebuttable) legal presumptions. 7 In this regard, the GVRs
provide exemptions under the Block Exemption Regulation ("BER") and
Article 81(3). ll1e GVRs do not apply any rules of per se illegality in the
analysis of foreclosure theories. I discuss the BER market share rules briefly
at the end of the article.
Antitrust and competition analysis involves two competing economic
welfare standards. A "consumer welfare" standard evaluates restraints in

5.
M. Riordan and S. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach,
63 Antitrust L.J. 513 (1995).
6.
As discussed b elow, the analysis of input foreclosure also applies to a situation
where a distributor agrees only to serve a single manufacturer. This is because distribution
services can be viewed as an input that the manufacturer purchases from distributors. Thus,
"single branding" can be evaluated as input foreclosure too.
7.
For a recent review of this "decision theoretic" approach to summary disposition,
see F. Beckner andS. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 Antitrust L. J. 41 (1999)
and the references cited therein.
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terms of their effects on consumers. Under this standard, cost savings and
other efficiency benefits created by the restraints are cognizable only if they
are shared with consumers by being passed along to consumers in the form
of lower prices or superior products. If restraints injure competitors, that
competitor injury does not count for its own sake. In some cases, that
competitor injury may lead to consumer harm, which then does count.
However, consumer harm is not inevitable and may not be presumed merely
from the fact that competitors are injured. After all, producing a better
product also harms competitors even as it benefits consumers.
A competing antitrust standard is the "aggregate welfare" standard. (It
sometimes is referred to as an "efficiency" standard.) This standard grades
restraints on the basis of their aggregate impact on all participants consumers, the parties adopting the restraint and their competitors. The
aggregate welfare standard is indifferent to transfers of wealth among these
parties. The efficiency benefits need not be passed through to consumers in
order to count.
The issue of injury to competitors creates significant confusion. For
example, Robert Bork stressed that efficiencies should count in antitrust; he
was a driving force in the U.S. courts' recognizing the importance of efficiency
benefits. 8 Bork also argued that courts should view injury to competitors as
insufficient to condemn restraints. He argued that competitors complain
about conduct that increases efficiency and benefits consumers and
competition. Despite this recognition, however, Bork failed to embrace the
consumer welfare standard. Although he states that the goal of antitrust is
the maximization of consumer welfare, he adopted the aggregate welfare
standard instead. This standard does not require the pass-through of
efficiency benefits to consumers. It also would treat competitor injury as part
of the balance, irrespective of its effect on consumers. Bork never comments
on this confusing inconsistency.
The GVRs do not present a perfectly clear picture of their underlying
welfare standard. In some places, they seem to have in mind a consumer
welfare standard in which efficiency benefits must be shared with consumers
in order to count For example, in discussing the relevant factors under Article
81(3), the GVRs state that permissible vertical restraints must have efficiency
benefits. In addition, the GVRs state that "the vertical agreement must allow
consumers a fair share of these benefits." Indeed, ~134 goes on to say that the
vertical restraints must be "indispensable" to attain the benefits. This
approach then is developed in more detail in ~136. 9
The next three sections evaluate in turn the procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects of exclusives involved in vertical restraints.

8.
R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1979)
9.
However, the GVRs are not always clear about whether they require proof of likely
harm to consumers to condenm a restraint or whether harm to competitors by itself is
sufficient, as discussed in more detail later on.
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PROCOMPETITIVE BENEFITS OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS

Exclusive contracts can be procompetitive. ll1ey can facilitate a type of
vertical integration "by contract" and other sources of consumer benefits.
Integration can create efficiency benefits by improving product design and
product quality. Other efficiency benefits may arise from eliminating free
riding or coordinating incentives in other ways. Consumers also benefit from
lower prices or superior products that coordination may bring. Where such
efficiency benefits occur, they can reduce the potential harm from exclusivity
or might even lead to a net consumer welfare benefit instead of a net
consumer harm. ll1us, the analysis of efficiency benefits is included in the
economic analysis of impact on consumers.
Exclusive contracts can improve coordination between the parties to the
exclusives. In particular, exclusives can eliminate free riding and induce
greater focus on activities that serve the joint interests of the parties to the
agreement. In this way, competition can be increased and consumers can
gain. llms, if efficiency claims are real and not simply a pretext for adopting
anticompetitive exclusives, they imply the need to balance harms against
benefits according to the appropriate welfare standard.
The GVRs examine the procompetitive benefits of exclusive contracts in
§1.2. A number of specific efficiency justifications are set out in ~116. The
general issue of acting in the mutual interest of the parties is not discussed
explicilly. 10 1l1is paragraph does examine the role of exclusive distribution in
resolving free rider problems. Consistent with the GVRs' focus on the
relationship among manufacturers and distributors, the discussion is focused
on promotional free riding, certification and similar manufacturer/ dealer
issues. The paragraph also raises the potential that exclusives would be
necessary to open up new markets, achieve economies of scale, avoid holdups
and so on.
1l1e GVRs express a concern about the potential scope of these efficiency
justifications and imply some skepticism towards broad efficiency claims.
This is made even clearer in ~ ~134-36 in setting out the conditions for
applying the exemption under Article 81(3). In these paragraphs, the GVRs
set a very high standard on vertical restraints alleged to create efficiency
benefits. First, the restraints must be "substantiated." ll1ey cannot involve
just "general statements on cost savings." Second, the efficiency benefits must
dominate any anticompetitive concerns so that they lead to an increase in
consumer welfare. ll1ird, the restraints must be "indispensable to the
attainment of these benefits." Fourth, the GVRs suggest the possibility that
the restraints must be the "least anticompetitive" alternative.
These conditions are similar in some ways to U.S. antitrust law and differ
in other ways. ll1e first two conditions are discussed in the evaluation of

10. In 1101 the GVRs recognize that incentives can change when the upstream and
downstream finnsshare profits. In that paragraph, they focus on potential anticompetitive
ham1S, not procompelitive benefits. However, the same sharing of profits also incentivizes
the firms lo lake greater procompetitive actions that increase joint profits.
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"cogniz.ability" of efficiency benefits in the U.S. merger guidelines. The third
condition, the GVRs' "indispensability" standard, seems to set a higher
standard than the "reasonably necessary" standard commonly used in U.S.
antitrust law and recent guidelines. 11 As for the fourth condition, a "least anticompetitive" alternative standard sometimes is viewed as implicit in the
"reasonably necessary" test in U.S. law and sometimes is viewed as a more
stringent standard. The more stringent test remains controversial.

IV.

INPUT FORECLOSURE

One type of competitive concern can be characterized as input foreclosure. 12
This involves the potential anticompetitive effects raised when a firm becomes
the exclusive customer of its input suppliers or when those suppliers provide
their inputs on more favorable terms to the firm. Such agreements may
disadvantage the firm's rivals in the output market by cutting off their supply
or raising their cost of critical inputs. Not only may such an input market
disadvantage injure rivals, it also may harm the customers of the output
market competitors by giving the excluding firm the power to raise or
maintain its prices above the competitive level. That is, the exclusive
agreements may give the firm what might be termed exclusio1Lary market
power.
These inputs may be unbranded inputs in the production of a commodity,
such as electricity for smelting aluminum. The inputs can be components
used to create a finished product or system, such as tires for an automobile or
an operating system for a computer. A retail distributor views the brands that
it resells as inputs. At the same lime, as illustrated in Example 3 below, a
manufacturer may view retail distribution as an input into the sale of its
product. (This issue is also discussed in the customer foreclosure section.)

A.

Two-Step Aualysis of Co11s11111er Harm

ll1e potential anticompetitive harm from this type of exclusivity strategy
can be determined by a two-step analysis of the structure and conduct in
input and output markets. The first "raising rivals' costs" step examines
whether rivals' input costs are raised or their efficiency is degraded. The

11. This point is made explicit in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines. As they
state in section 3.2,"an aereement may be 'reasonably necessary' without being essential.
However, if the participants could achieve an equivalent or comparable efficiency-enhancing
integration through practical, si&lificantly less restrictive m eans, then the Agencies conclude
that the agreement is not reasonably necessary ." (emphasis added)
12. The analysis of exclusion in this section and the next relies on a number of my own
articles and the references to others' articles cited there. For example, see T. Krattenmaker
andS. Salop, Antico1{1petitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals Costs To Achieve Power Over Price,
96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); M. Riordan and S. Salop, supra note 6; S. Salop and R. C. Romaine,
Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 George Mason
LR. 617 (1999).
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second "power over price" step examines whether prices paid by consumers
in the output market are increased, relative to the appropriate competitive
benchmark.

1.

Raising Rivals' Costs

The first step evaluates the impact on input prices and rivals' costs. This
step involves potential injury to competitors. The inquiry here focuses on the
issue whether competitors' costs of the foreclosed input will likely increase as
a result of the exclusives. In particular, it evaluates the number and quality
of alternative suppliers along with the prices they likely will charge. As a
general matter, if rivals can substitute to equally cost-effective alternative
inputs and the effectiveness of input market competition is not reduced, then
there would be no competitor harm. Of course, if competitors are not
disadvantaged, then there can be no significant consumer harm either.
The existence of input suppliers who are not tied up by the exclusive
arrangements means that rivals have options and are not totally foreclosed.
However, other input suppliers may not be sufficient to prevent rivals' costs
from being raised. First, the ability of remaining input suppliers to expand
may be constrained by capacity limits. Second, their costs and prices may be
higher than the suppliers who are parties to the exclusives. Third, if there are
only a small number of unrestrained suppliers, they may have the incentive
to raise their prices in response to the exclusives. This is because they no
longer face competition from the input suppliers who now have been tied up
by the exclusives and can no longer sell to certain potential customers. In this
sense, the exclusives may facilitate tacit or express collusion among the
unrestrained suppliers still available to the rivals. This last condition
sometimes is overlooked in vertical restraint analysis. Doing so creates a
significant potential for error.

2.

Power Over Price

The second step evaluates the impact on output prices flowing from any
cost increase borne by the rivals. This step involves potential injury to
consumers. The inquiry here focuses on the issue of whether output market
prices will likely increase or whether rivals in the relevant output market, both
the excluded firms and other firms that produce close substitutes, instead will
maintain the ability and incentive to compete effectively. Because there may
be close substitutes for the product of the firm that achieves the exclusives and
its competitors, injury to these competitors docs not necessarily imply injury
to consumers. Instead, competition among non-excluded firms may remain
intense and there may be competition with other firms that have their own
exclusives. This last point means that multiple exclusives actually may cause
less of an anticompetitive effect, a type of "reverse" cumulative effect, as
discussed in Example 2 below. Competition with substitute products also
may prevent prices from rising.
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If rivals' costs are raised, the firm that obtains the exclusive may be able to
gain market power to raise prices in the downstream (output) market. This
power over price may involve either unilateral action or tacit coordination
with downstream competitors. l11e parties to the coordinated conduct may
include those competitors disadvantaged by the higher input costs or other
exclusionary conduct In a sense, these partially excluded rivals could be said
to be involuntarily induced to cooperate, as a result of their higher costs. In
this way the integrated firm achieves market power, that is, the power to price
above the competitive level in the output market. As discussed below, this
power may involve raising price above the pre-exclusion level or maintaining
a high price in the face of competition that otherwise would have forced price
down.
Where both these steps are proved, the exclusionary conduct harms
consumers and reduces economic efficiency, absent offsetting procompetitive
efficiency benefits. Consumers are harmed by the higher downstream prices.
Efficiency can be reduced in two ways by this conduct. First, a consumer
deadweight loss results if and when consumers reduce their purchase levels.
Second, the higher costs borne by rivals may lead those firms to utilize an
inefficient input mix or may lead relatively more efficient firms to reduce their
market shares.
This raises a distinction between this achievement and exercise of
excl11sio11ary market power and classical market power. 13 l11e classical market
power of a monopolist permits it profitably lo raise and maintain price above
the competitive level by restricting its ow11 output. Excl11sio11ary market power
is the power profitably to raise or maintain price above the competitive level
by conduct that raises the cosl'i or otherwise disadvantages competitors in the
output market. Excl11sio11ary market power does not require the excluding
firm also to have classicnl market power. If rivals' costs are increased by being
foreclosed from an input, they will restrict their output and raise price,
permitting the excluding firm to increase its output price too. In addition, the
exercise of exclusionary market power sometimes involves preventing entry
or raising the cost of entry of competitors that otherwise would drive output
prices down.
l11e analysis of the exclusives and the relevant market must be sensitive
to the type of anticompetitive allegation. 14 In particular, where the allegation
is that the exclusives will prevent prices from falling, then competition from
other firms or other products that would constrain prices from rising above
the current, pre-exclusive price level would not prevent the alleged
anticompetitive effect. l11e fact that prices caru1ot rise does not mean that they
cannot be prevented from falling. Analysis that is not sensitive to this issue
is prone to error. This issue is illustrated in Example 4.

13. See T. Krallenmaker, R. Lande and S. Sa lop, Monopoly Power and Market Power
in Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. Univ. L. Rev. 241 (1987).

14. S. Salop, The First Principles Approach lo Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the
Millennium, 68 Antitrust L. J. 187 (2000).

EC GUIDELINES ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

B.

185

Illustrative Examples

This section sets out some examples to illustrate the analysis of input
foreclosure.
1.

Example 1: two-step approacl1

There are 4 major producers of portrait cameras used by professional
portrait photographers. A new "flash" technology has been developed that
uses halogen bulbs and computerized timing. There are three developers in
this area, each of which has its own patented technology. The leading camera
producer, which has a 40% market share, has made exclusive agreements with
two of these three halogen flash technology companies.
Analysis: These exclusives can reduce the quality of rivals' camera
offerings or raise their costs. There is one developer left. However, that
developer's technology may be inappropriate for some of the camera
competitors or more expensive. In addilion, realizing that it no longer faces
any competition in selling to the three camera companies, this one remaining
developer may exploit its quasi-monopoly position by raising its price. If the
camera competitors' costs are raised or their quality reduced, the leading
camera company may gain the ability to raise or maintain its camera price. As
a result, camera purchasers may be harmed.
A change in facts can alter the conclusions. If there were six competing
flash technologies instead of three, then the likelihood that exclusives with
two of them would disadvantage rivals would be reduced. Four choices
would remain, despite the exclusives. In the downstream market, if portrait
cameras are not distinct but face intense competition from other 35mm
cameras, then the leading firm may be unable to raise its price, even if it
successfully can disadvantage other portrait camera rivals.

2.

Example 2: Multiple buyers witlt exclusives

Videoworld is the largest video movie rental chain in several member
states, followed closely by California Video and Videomax. These three retail
chains account for 70% of all video rentals, with the rest accounted for by
small stores and mail order sales. Videoworld recently made an agreement
with the distribution arm of one of the five major movie distributors for an
exclusive that permits Videoworld to obtain a two-month exclusive on its
choice of 20% of the new movies offered by this distributor each year.
California Video and Videomax followed this by striking their own similar
exclusivity deals with two of the other distributors.
Analysis: This series of agreements cuts off the smaller video rental stores'
access to 20% of the new videos offered by three of the five distributors. This
can place them at a disadvantage by cutting off their early access to the
newest hit videos. At the same time, they can continue to compete on
remaining non-exclusive videos and are unencumbered by the exclusives after
two months, as well as all the new videos offered by the other distributors.
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Whether or not these retail competitors are significantly disadvantaged in the
market involves the degree of substitutability among these classes of videos
and competition among the distributors. This analysis includes, of course, the
same type of substitution analysis that would be used for determining
whether the sale of new, hit videos constitutes a separate relevant market,
though the focus is somewhat altered.
A second issue involves the fact that multiple video rental chains have
exclusives. The GVRs (at ~133) raise the issue of the "cumulative" effect from
multiple exclusives. ll1e "cumulative" exclusivity here increases the likelihood
of an adverse impact on rivals that do not have such exclusivity agreements,
as well as potential entrants. However, it does not inevitably increase the
likelihood of an adverse anticompetitive effect on consumers. Competition
among the three chains with the exclusives will continue. In fact, it may
intensify if the exclusives have significant procompelilive benefits, say by
eliminating free riding.15 If the exclusives create efficiency benefits that reduce
costs, then the competition can lead to even lower prices as then more efficient
firms compete more effectively. 1hus, merely assuming that such multiple
exclusives magnify the competitive concerns may lead to error.
3.

Example 3: Distribution services as i11puts

The sale of "consumable" office products by office "superstores" has been
a growing phenomenon. ll1ese stores have lower costs that tend to translate
into lower retail prices. ll1ere are three office superstore chains in Europe:
L'Office Max, Euroclips and Bern.hards. These three chains compete with each
other and also with the numerous stationary stores and other retail outlets
that distribute consumable office products. The leading producer of
transparent tape recently has made agreements with each of the three
superstores to carry its tape exclusively, in exchange for a substantial lump
sum annual payment to the stores.
Analysis: Although products flow from the manufacturer to the retailer
and then to the customer, the supply of retail distribution services can be
viewed analytically as inputs into the sale of products by manufacturers.
Examined in th.is way, these exclusives may raise the distribution costs of the
competing tape manufacturers by foreclosing them from the lowest cost
distribution channel. llms, even if these Lape companies remain viable, their

15. In particular, the rationale for the exclusives needs to be investigated. It is possible
that the purpose and effect of the exclusives are to increase promotion of the videos and
reduce free riding. For example, as part of the exclusivity agreements, perhaps the chains
promised to stock more copies of the videos in order to avoid an out-of-stock situation. In
addition, perhaps the chains promised to significantly increase their promotion of the
exclusive videos. Even without the exclusives, their incentives to promote would reasonably
be expected to increase from the exclusives because other chains would not share in the
additional rentals generated by the advertisements. Coupled with the fact that the three
exclusives tie up only 20% of the new videos for only three of the five distributors, the
impact on competition may be procompetilive on balance.
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high distribution costs may give the leading tape company the power to raise
or maintain a non-competitive price.
In the statement of the example, it was stated that the exclusives were
secured by lump sum payments to the distributors. Economic theory predicts
that lump sum payments are not passed on to consumers in the form of lower
prices. However, if the exclusives instead were secured by providing the
distributors with discounted wholesale prices or payments tied directly to
sales levels, the results are different. In this case, the retailers would have
lower variable costs and, thus, a greater incentive to pass through at least a
portion of the discount to consumers in the form of a lower retail price.
Similarly, suppose that the agreements require the retailers to reduce their
retail prices. Such "variable" payments would reduce the potential harm from
exclusives and make it more likely that they would benefit consumers. 16

4.

Exnmple 4: Avoiding price competition

Trialsoft is the leading provider of litigation support database software,
with over 50% of the market. Law firm offices purchase litigation support
software. It requires extensive training and customer support over time as the
product improves. The companies rely on independent consultants to provide
the training, particularly the consulling arms of the large accounting firms.
A new database entrant, NeuralSearch, has created an innovative database
program that uses neural network techniques that dramatically improve the
efficiency of searches and permit linkages to be taken to higher
dimensionality. Trialsoft has only just begun to work on upgrading its
product using neural network techniques and is still 1-2 years away from
having a product as good as the current release of NeuralSearch's product.
NeuralSearch is in the process of soliciting consulting firms to sell and support
its software. To counter the entry of NeuralSearch, Trialsoft has begun to
require its distributors to sell only its database program. The consulting firms
would prefer to sell both programs because most clients do not need the
complexity of the NeuralSearch product and Trialsoft's other competitors
mostly appeal to specialized customer niches.
Analysis: The possible competitive concern here is that the Trialsoft
exclusives will delay or deter the entry of NeuralSearch, if NeuralSearch
cannot find sufficient alternative dealers.
Absent substitute dealers,
consumers may be denied access to the superior NeuralSearch product as well
as to the price and innovation competition that it may induce in Trialsoft. It
is true that Trialsoft faces competition from firms other than NeuralSearch and
this competition does constrain Trialsoft's prices to some extent. However,
because it has a sui-,erior product, NeuralSearch may be able to create a degree
of competition that those products cannot. As a result, NeuralSearch's entry

16. In carrying out the analysis of this issue, it is important to ensure that the discounts
were not based on or accompanied by wholesale price increases and that net wholesale
prices actually were reduced.
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may force Trialsoft to reduce its prices and innovate faster. The timing of
Trialsoft's new exclusivity policy also is suspicious.
Competition for exclusives is unlikely to deter Trialsoft market power in
this situation. NeuralSearch is not well positioned to obtain an exclusive
because its product appeals only to a limited group of clients. Even if
NeuralSearch and the others would band together, it is still not clear that the
consulting firms would view them as a good alternative to Trialsoft in an allor-nothing competition for exclusives. In addition, it would be difficult for
NeuralSearch and the other niche competitors to coordinate a response to
Trialsoft. That coalition likely would face free rider problems and other
transactions costs.
C.

Applicatio11 to the GVRs

The GVRs' analysis of "limited distribution" (at ,,109-10) and "exclusive
distribution" at ilil161-77) is generally consistent with the basic theory of input
foreclosure, where the inputs are the brands resold by the distributor. Thus,
when a manufacturer limits its number of resellers or has an exclusive
distribution system in which it sells to only a single reseller in an area, it
forecloses the other dealers from access to the "input" it produces. As stated
in ,103, this can raise barriers to entry. It can also facilitate collusion at the
buyers' level in the output market, as discussed in ,167.
As explained in ,24, the GVRs cover all types of vertical agreements.
However, the GVRs focus mainly on manufacturer/ distributor relations, not
the broader type of exclusives or favoritism that might arise with respect to
other inputs used in the production and sale of goods and services. In fact, in
,96(i) the GVRs suggest that vertical restraints for intermediate goods
generally are less worrisome. Similarly, in ,119 (5) the GVRs conclude that
vertical restraints for "non-branded" goods and services generally raise fewer
competition concerns because differentiation reduces the degree of
substitution. Inputs such as electricity used in aluminum production would
seem to fit within this category of non-branded goods.
However, this approach may be too permissive. Even if inputs are not
differentiated, significant competitive concerns nonetheless can be raised
when the input producers' costs differ or where there is limited capacity.
Concerns also can arise when the input market is sufficiently concentrated
that elimination of the restrained supplier from the exclusive gives the
remaining suppliers the ability and incentive to coordinate to raise their prices.
Paragraph 119(5) also suggests that there are fewer concerns about
intermediate goods (i.e., inputs) because buyers lend to be more sophisticated.
Sophisticated buyers who account for a large share of a seller's sales clearly
can help to deter price increases. However, that point does not seem to be the
focus here. Moreover, these conditions do not inevitably occur for
intermediate goods.
Another issue i~1volves the distinction between injury to competitors and
injury to competition. The theory of input foreclosure set out above requires
a showing of likely injury to the consumers who purchase in the output
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market. This injury could arise either from unilateral market power by the
distributor who has the exclusive or from coordination between that
distributor and others. Such proof of likely consumer injury generally is
required under U.S. antitrust law when manufacturers unilaterally adopt
vertical restraints. 17
It is not entirely certain under what circumstances the GVRs require proof
of injury to competition versus the circumstances in which evidence of injury
to the excluded competitors is sufficient. On the one hand, ~96(i) clearly
seems concerned wilh downstream effects and seems to suggest the type of
two-step analysis set out above. As staled in this paragraph:
a vertical aereement may not only have effects on lhe market
between supplier and buyer but may also have effects on
downstream markets. For an individual assessment of a vertical
agreement, the relevant markets at each level of trade affected by
the restraints contained in the agreement will be examined.
In a similar vein, ~103 discusses barriers to entry and 1119(1) discusses
market power (presumably downstream) and loss of interbrand competition.
Similarly, ~119 (5) talks about injury to "competition." In addition, the second
harm mentioned in 1110 involves the potential for the restraints to facilitate
tacit or express collusion in the output or input market. Collusion in the
output market (where the distributors operate) would typically lead to
consumer injury, so th.is would be consistent with proof of power over price. 18
On the other hand, iJllO does not make it perfectly clear whether likely
harm to final consumers is required. As stated in 1110, one of the three
possible negative effects on competition is that "certain buyers within that
market can no longer buy from that particular supplier, and this may lead in
particular in the case of exclusive supply, to foreclosure of the purchase
market." 1l1e issue becomes whether "foreclosure of the purchase market"
means injury to consumers or whether it simply means injury to the
competitors who are denied access to the product. 1l1at is, in terms of the

17. The situation is different when adoption of the vertical restraints involves a
horizontal agreement. For a recent case, see Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,
2000 U.S. App. Lexis 18304. For analysis of input foreclosure applied to vertical restraints
adopted by a group of competitors, see D. Carlton & S. Salop, You Keep on Knocking but
You Can't Come in: Evaluating Restrictions on Access to Input Joint Ventures, 9 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 319 (1996). For a provocative analysis of the use of truncated rules applied to
vertical restraints, see A. D. Melamed, Exclusionary Vertical Agreements, Speech Before the
ABA Antitrust Section (Apr. 2, 1998), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
1623.htm. For the application of truncated rules to monopolists' conduct, see J. Baker,
Promoting limovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev.,
495 (1999).
18. Express collusion in the input market would be illegal under U.S. law, irrespective
of its impact on downstream markets. If it involves only tacit coordination that is facilitated
by the fact that the exclusive eliminates a competitor, then impact in the downstream market
probably also would be required.
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tem1inology used above, is it enough to prove that the exclusives likely lead
to "raising rivals' costs," or must the government also prove that the
downstream firm likely gains "power over price?"
Another possible difference between the statement of input foreclosure
here and the GVRs involves the treatment of multiple exclusives and
cumulative foreclosure. For example, the concern about collusion in i(llO is
focused on the situation in which "most or all of the competing suppliers" limit
the number of retailers. However, multiple exclusives are not necessary to
cause a potential coordination problem under the input foreclosure theory.
For example, if exclusives raise the cost of one or more downstream rivals of
the firm that adopts the exclusive, those higher costs could facilitate pricing
coordination among the downstream firms. Indeed, Jonathan Baker has
described the impact of such cost-raising strategies as pushing the foreclosed
rivals into an "involuntary cartel" in the downstream market. 19 Exclusives can
facilitate express or tacit collusion among the input suppliers because the
exclusive eliminates the competition from the restrained supplier.
At the same lime, as discussed in Example 2, the fact that multiple
suppliers have exclusives does not necessarily cause a reinforcing, cumulative
effect that facilitates collusion. It is also possible that continued competition
amone the distributors that have exclusives can prevent prices from rising. In
fact, if the exclusives create efficiency benefits that reduce costs, then
competition may be intensified and even lead to lower prices under some
conditions.
As discussed above, exclusives can lead to prices above the competitive
level. These price effects sometimes involve a firm that already has some
market power being able to "enhance" its market power by using exclusives
to raise price further above the competitive level. As written in i(119(1), the
GVRs appear to focus only on this case of "enhancing" market power.
However, this is not the only potential competitive harm. Vertical restraints
also may permit a firm that initially lacks market power in the world without
exclusives lo "achieve" market power as a result of the exclusivity. Or, they
can allow a firm with market power to "maintain" its market power by raising
the costs of new entrants or fringe firms that otherwise would cause price
decreases in the absence of the exclusives.
The GVRs' focus on firms that already have classical market power also
raises another potential limitation on the constraints they place on the firms'
conduct. The GVRs state in i(120 (1) that the first step in the competitive
evaluation is the determination of the relevant market. To avoid errors,
relevant markets should not be defined in a vacuum but rather in the context
of the anticompetitive allegations.2° For example, in the U.S. duPont
monopolization case, the Supreme Court committed what is now known as

19. Jonathan Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive
Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 Antitrust L. J. 517,523 (1996).
20. S. Salop, First Principles, supra note 15.
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the Cellopl1m1e Trnp. 21 Because duPont was charging the monopoly price for
cellophane wrapping, it could not profitably raise ils price any more. Indeed,
this is the very definition of the monopoly price. Rather than recognizing that
duP011t's monopoly was the cause of the unprofitability of additional price
increases, the Supreme Court erroneously concluded that duPont lacked
market power in a broader flexible wrapping market. By defining the relevant
market first, and in the absence of any detailed evaluation of the potential
harms of vertical restraints, the GVRs sometimes may commit the classic
Cellophane Trnp or a related error. ll1is obviously also could be a major
problem in certain cases in which the block exemption regulation is applied,
as discussed in more detail in Section VI.
V. CUSTOMER FORECLOSURE
Customer foreclosure refers to using exclusive contracts and other
strategies that exclude rivals from access to a sufficient customer base. If the
use of exclusives can reduce the sales of a competitor sufficiently, that
competitor may be driven below minimum viable scale (i.e., break-even sales
level) and forced to exit from the market. 22 Even if it does not exit, it may
suffer higher marginal costs that limit its ability to compete effectively. It may
also face reduced incentives to engage in non-price competition. As a result,
the exclusives may harm competition by giving the excluding firm the power
to raise its price or maintain a price above the competitive level. Alternatively,
the exclusives may harm competition by leading to higher prices in a related
output market.
Of course, where the competitive instrument of customer foreclosure is
solely offering low prices to consumers, consumer injury clearly is less likely
and antitrust law is rightfully skeptical. Whatever long-Lenn consumer harms
may occur from any resulting foreclosure must be balanced against the
immediate consumer benefits from the lower prices. For this reason, antitrust
standards for proving predatory pricing have tightened considerably over the
past two decades. 23
Tilis analysis also raises the question of how the firm is able to induce its
customers (either distributors or final consumers) to accept the exclusives.
One obvious way is for the excluding firm to "purchase" the exclusive, either

21. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S 377 (1956). For the classic
statement of the Supreme Court's error, see Donald Turner, Antitrust Policy and the
Cellophane Case, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1956).
22. E. Rasmusen, D. Ramseyer and J. Wiley, Naked Exclusion, 81 American Economic
Review 1137 (1991); M. Whinston and I. Segal, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90 American
Economic Review 2% (2000). For a further non-technical discussion, see Riordan and Salop,
supra note 6.
23. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993). For a recent economic analysis of this case and discussion of new theories of
predicting pricing, see Brolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy,
88 Geo. LR. 2239 (2000).
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in the form of a cash payment or a quid pro quo for some reciprocal favor.
Such "carrots" can induce customers to go along. The cost of these
exclusionary rights is unlikely to prevent the arrangement because the
exclusionary rights allow the firm to achieve or maintain market power over
many other customers. Of course, the smaller victims of the exclusives can try
to induce the distributors to continue to stock their products. However,
competition for exclusives does not take place on a level playing field. In
addition, the prospects of these supracompetitive profits should be sufficient
to allow the larger firm to compensate the exclusive customers for reducing
their choice. As discussed below, competition is a "public good" and each
individual customer and supplier has a natural inclination to act as a free
rider.

A. Illustrative Examples
1.

Example 5: Bnsic mwlytics

An exciting new innovation in photofinishing involves a self-service filmdeveloping machine. TI1e consumer places the film cartridge in the machine
and the prints or diskettes with digitized images are produced fifteen minutes
later. TI1e machines also can produce prints from diskettes. The two firms
producing these machines, Cadko and Eurofilm, have competing technologies
and their machines have somewhat different features, advantages and
disadvantages. Cadko was the first entrant and followed a strategy of
exclusive contracting with the largest grocery and drug store chains in
exchange for large lump sum payments. When Eurofilm came on the scene,
it found that Cadko already had exclusives with a significant number of the
large chains. Cadko also has told potential customers that Eurofilm will fail
and they will be stuck with its expensive machine. This has led other chains
to reject Eurofilm's product because of a fear that Cadko's headstart would
cause Eurofilm to fail.
Analysis: TI1is use of exclusives prevents the chains from giving final
consumers a choice by placing both machines in their stores. They also might
cause Eurofilm's entry to fail. TI1e lump sum payments for the exclusives
likely are not passed through to consumers and Cadko does not require the
chains to charee lower prices, so there are no direct consumer price benefits
from the exclusives. The exclusives also could eliminate longer run price and
innovation competition by preventing Eurofilm from reaching minimum
viable scale and instead causing it to exit from the market. Thus, the
exclusives may cause consumer harm. In contrast, if Eurofilm can sign up a
sufficient number of exclusive retailers itself, then it would not be driven out
of business. Potential efficiency rationales also would be relevant to
competitive evaluations.

EC GUIDELINES ON VERTICAL RESTRAIN1S

2.

193

Example 6: Relationship to input foreclosure

Recalling Example 2, office product office "superstores" have lower costs.
There are three office superstore chains in Europe: L'Office Max, Euroclips and
Bernhards. ll1ese three chains compete with each other and also with the
numerous stationery stores and other retail outlets that distribute consumable
office products. ll1e leading producer of transparent tape recently has made
agreements with each of the three superstores to carry its tape exclusively, in
exchange for a substantial lump sum annual payment.
Analysis: TI1is problem was previously analyzed as input foreclosure. It
was seen there that the exclusives could raise the distribution costs of the tape
competitors. ll1is problem also can be seen as customer foreclosure. If the
tape competitors are unable to arrange efficient alternative distribution
charu1els, their sales may be driven below minimum viable scale, forcing them
to exit. Alternatively, their lower customer base may reduce their incentives
to advertise, f urlher entrenching the dominant firm. Their incentives to
innovate also may be compromised, allowing the dominant producer to
maintain its market power in the future.
3.

Example 7: Impact i11 related output market

Referring back lo Example 5, Cadko is the largest film producer in the
world. Cadko's self-service photofinishing machines work best with its own
film. Competing film comes out somewhat grainy. This "problem" was not
corrected by a recent software upgrade that did improve the quality for Cadko
film. Tilis "problem" does not arise with the Eurofilm machines. As the selfservice machines have become established, Cadko's market share in the sale
of film has risen significantly. In addition, there are rumors in the financial
press that Cadko's largest film competitor has canceled some research and
development projects because of cash flow shortfalls.
Analysis: ll1is example illustrates how an exclusive in one market (e.g.,
photofinishing) can have effects in related markets (e.g., film). Even if there
is no competitive harm in the photofulishing market, the exclusives could lead
to anticompetitive effects in the film market. ll1e impact on related markets
is necessary for a full competitive valuation.

4.

Example 8: Exclusives wit/, final customers

A daily newspaper in a small town faced no competition for readers or
advertisers until a new free weekly newspaper recently entered the market.
Advertisers view the weekly as a partial substitute for the daily newspaper
and have begun lo shift some of their advertising to the weekly. In response
to this entry, the daily newspaper announced a new exclusivity policy by
which advertisers must devote either all or none of their newspaper
advertising to it ll1e newspaper refused advertising from several advertisers
who did not follow its policy, which has led all of its big advertisers to drop
their advertising in the weekly. As a result, the weekly is suffering large
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losses and has announced its intention to cease publication unless the
situation improves si3nificantly within the next three months.
Analysis: Advertisers are customers of newspapers, not distributors.
However, exclusives with ultimate customers can have anticompetitive effects.
In this example, the all-or-nothing exclusive contract can deter the entry of the
weekly newspaper. 1l1e weekly can not totally replace the daily for most
advertisers, but only supplement it. By forcing advertisers to choose in this
way, the exclusives will reduce the customer base for the weekly, possibly
driving it below minimum viable scale. Even if there are enough advertisers
who could switch their entire advertising budget to the weekly, they may be
afraid to try, because if the weekly fails despite their business, the daily
newspaper may subsequently retaliate against these advertisers by charging
them higher prices. Alternatively, the daily may exploit the fear that the
entrant will fail, by inducing advertisers, to sign long-term exclusive
agreements in exchange for small payments.

B.

Applicatio11 to the GVRs

TI1e GVRs apply the analysis of customer foreclosure to "single branding"
restraints in iJ106 and then in more detail in Section 2.1 (~~138-60). "Single
branding" refers to a buyer concentrating his orders for a product with one
supplier. 1l1is specialization can restrict the market available to other
suppliers. In particular, where the buyers are distributors, the other
manufacturers may lack adequate distribution as a result. Or, as stated in
~107, this may lead lo "foreclosure of the market." As the GVRs point out, this
theory also applies lo Lying, where the foreclosure involves the "tied" product
market. (See also ~~215-24). It also is applied lo exclusive supply (at ~~20214).
The GVRs discuss a number of relevant factors for evaluating such
restraints. I will highlight some of them here. One key factor is the market
position of the buyer. The larger the buyer taking the exclusive, the smaller
the customer base remaining available to competing suppliers. This factor is
stressed in ~125 and ~141. 1l1e GVRs explain why the market share of the
buyer is relevant to evaluating customer foreclosure. Entry barriers at the
buyer's level also are relevant in evaluating the degree of real foreclosure, as
explained in ~144.
The market position of the supplier also is discussed. I found this
discussion in the GVRs somewhat confusing. Even if there are numerous
other efficient suppliers available, there can still be competitive harm if one of
the suppliers ties up a large number of buyers. In effect, the exclusives can
raise barriers to entry to other suppliers. As a result, the supplier with the
exclusives will gain market power and increase ils market share. Thus, the
"initial" market position may be less relevant than the impact on the barriers
facing competing suppliers.
This seems to ·be an issue of the guidelines being unclear rather than
logically flawed. if127 recognizes the effect of exclusives on barriers to entry
in general. When the analysis is applied to the single branding issue in ~144,
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the GVRs point out that barriers to entry on the buyers' .level is relevant to
evaluating whether the exclusives can cause barriers to entry and competitive
problems at the suppliers' level. As ~144 states, if it is "relatively easy for
competing suppliers lo create new buyers," then foreclosure is "unlikely to be
a real problem."
The GVRs also discuss the issue of cumulative effects with respect to single
branding. As discussed in ~149, concerns are expanded when multiple
suppliers tie up a limited number of available buyers. (See also ~206).
Multiple exclusives do increase the barriers lo entry facing competing
suppliers. However, as mentioned earlier, the ultimate consumers may be
protected by the continued competition among the suppliers and buyers that
have the exclusives. l11e GVRs apparently are more skeptical of the strength
of this competition.
In some cases, a combination of input and customer foreclosure can permit
a vertically integrated firm to entrench market power by raising barriers to
entry. This occurs when the exclusives, in effect, force new entrants to enter
both the input and output markets simultaneously. This is sometimes
referred to as the "two-level entry" problem. By raising the sunk capital costs
of entry, requiring the entrant to have expertise in both markets and creating
coordination costs, two-tier entry is more likely to be deterred than would be
entry into a single market. l11e GVRs mention this issue in ~127. Then, in
~171 they point out that the combination of exclusive distribution (input
foreclosure) with single branding (customer foreclosure) increases the
likelihood of harm. (See also ~207, with respect to exclusive supply).
C.

Co111petitio11 for Exclusives

l11is analysis of exclusives in both input and customer foreclosure raises
the question of why the entrants cannot simply compete in the "market" for
exclusives. To the extent that the exclusives create procompetitive efficiency
benefits, competition might well be maximized when each of the firms has
some exclusives. For example, this is the case with television programs. A
particular program is broadcast exclusively on one network, and each network
has its own exclusive programs. A similar type of structure was described in
the Videoworld and the (first) Cadko example.
The GVRs are sensitive to the role of competition for exclusives in
preventing anticompetitive harm. As slated in ~108 with respect to single
branding (customer foreclosure), the "reduction in inter-brand competition
may be mitigated by strong initial competition to obtain the single branding
contracts." Confidence in the constraining power of competition for exclusives
has led a number of U.S. courts to take a very permissive approach to
exclusives with a short contractual duration. 24

24. See, e.g., Omega Envtl. Inc. v. Gilbarco Inc. 123 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997); Paddock
Publications, Inc. v Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996); U.S. Healthcare Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
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In my view, however, the constraints created by competition for exclusives
should not be overestimated when there is a dominant firm or the market is
highly concentrated. This process differs from competition in the sale of
goods and services in a number of significant ways that can limit its benefits
to consumers. To begin with, when a firm pays a supplier, distributor or
customer to deal exclusively with it, it is not simply paying to obtain an
additional supply source, or channel of distribution, or customer for itself. It
also is paying for the right to exclude rivals from that supply source or
channel of distribution or customer. In fact, that exclusion may be the sole or
primary function of the exclusivity. This is not to say that exclusives are
always anticompetitive. Exclusives can eliminate free riding, improve
coordination or create other efficiency benefits. Efficiency benefits, however,
are not inherent in exclusives. Exclusives instead might reduce competition
by destroying rivals' efficient access to key inputs, make experimentation
more difficult and raise switching costs. Stated most simply, the firm may be
purchasing market power as well as a channel of distribution or source of
supply or additional customer.
There are a number of other reasons lo be skeptical of the consumer
protection provided by competition for exclusives. First, in some situations
there may not be real competition for the exclusives. An incumbent firm may
obtain long term exclusives before there is another competitor on the horizon.
By the lime the entrant is poised to enter, the input suppliers may be tied up
in long-term exclusive contracts. This situation was suggested in the Cadko
example. For the reasons discussed later on, one cannot count on the
suppliers to make decisions that adequately protect the interests of consumers
in these circumstances.
Second, even where competition for exclusives does occur, it may not take
place on a level playing field. The exclusive lends to be worth more to a
dominant incumbent than undoing the exclusive is worth to an equally
efficient entrant. This is because the entrant can earn only the (more
competitive) duopoly return, whereas a dominant incumbent may earn the
monopoly return if entry is deterred or significantly constrained. For example,
suppose that the incumbent could earn $200 if it gets the exclusive and so
retains its monopoly. If the entrant gets distribution and breaks the monopoly,
suppose that the entrant and incumbent each would earn $70, for a total of
$140. Because competition transfers weallh from producers to consumers, the
total profits fall from competition (e.g., from $200 to $140). In this case, the
entrant would be willing to bid up to $70 to obtain distribution, an amount
equal to its profits from entry. In contrast, the incumbent would be willing to
bid up to $130 for an exclusive that prevents the entry, an amount equal to the
reduction in its profits from competition. The incumbent thus would win the
bidding. This result obtains for as long as the aggregate market profits fall
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from competilion. 25 ll1is example also shows why competition for exclusives
can not be assumed to reach the efficient outcome.
1his is not a "deep pocket" argument ll1e incumbent's bidding advantage
comes from the fact that it has already sunk the costs of entry together with
the fact that monopoly profits exceed the profits in the more duopoly or
competitive post entry market profits. Entry barriers are raised because the
entrant's need to outbid the incumbent artificially raises its fixed costs of
entry. ll1e bidding disadvantage faced by the entrant is "artificial" in the
sense that the exclusivity does not have real and direct efficiency benefits in
the example, but instead has the sole effect of raising barriers to entry.
Third, exclusives increase switching costs and eliminate the ability of
suppliers or consumers to experiment by devoting only a portion of their
business to the entrant. This in turn raises their risk of switching. For the
entrant, this decreases the likelihood that entry will succeed. This increased
difficulty of coordination and the resulting barriers to entry and expansion are
reinforced if the exclusive contracts are long-term and have "staggered"
expiration dates. 26 ll1ese factors extend the period before the entrant can
achieve viability. ll1ey also reinforce the consumers' or suppliers' expectations
that the entry will not succeed, which may in turn make them less willing to
take the risk of foregoing the exclusive in order to remain available to the
entrant. As a result, they may require larger inducements to switch to the
entrants, thus raising entry costs still further.
This analysis of experimentation and switching costs suggests another
reason why the entrant may face a bidding disadvantage. The retailers may
not find the entrant's product adequate as its only offering, whereas the
incumbcnt's product may be sufficient. In this situation, the entrant does not
desire (or could it practically obtain) an exclusive. Instead, it wants only to
maintain non-exclusivity. As discussed in the Trialsoft example, the
distributor might be able to substitute a number of independent brands for
the incumbent. But, in a bidding situation, these independent firms would
face coordina lion problems in bidding against the dominant incumbent.
Fourth, even if exclusives are terminable at will or embedded in short-term
contracts, they still may erect a difficult coordination problem for an entrant.
This increases the risk that the entrant will be unable to get enough
distributors or enough customers to rapidly achieve minimum viable scale
and maintain adequate investment incentives. Bidding still does not take
place on a level playing field. ll1e exclusives also can lead retailers to expect
the entry to fail, raising the fees the entrant must offer. This is because it is

25. S. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers and Proceedings)
335 (1979).
26. By "staggered" expiration dates, I mean that the contracts do not all expire at the
same time. This increases the coordination problem and entry costs facing the new entrant.
If all the contracts expired at the same tin1e, the entrant might be able to coordinate its entry
with the start-up dates of its own contracts. Of course, getting enough users to switch at the
same time is itself a difficult coordination problem. Thus, staggering is not necessary for
there to be a competitive problem.
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difficult to convince enough suppliers or consumers to switch at the same
time.
TI.us is not to say that competition for exclusives has no con~training effects
at all. It can. This is because the need to purchase exclusives also is costly to
the incumbent firm. This cost of buying exclusives can act as somewhat of a
deterrent. The constraint, however, is limited and does not eliminate
competitive concerns. Nor can the existence of this competition or exclusives
restricted to short durations legitimately provide the basis for an exemption
from antitrust scrutiny. The more important question is whether the
exclusives create real procompe titive efficiency benefits and whether those
benefits will be passed on to consumers in a competitive output market. This
is most likely when exclusives are divided up among the competing firms in
the output market.
This last point raises the question of why retailers or consumers ever
would cooperate by agreeing to an exclusive that might allow a firm to
achieve market power. This result, however, can occur because an individual
distributor or consumer ignores the effect of its decision on others. As a result,
the dominant firm can compensate the retailer or consumer for its own harm
and still earn money from the incremental power gained with respect to
others. In addition, if a retailer or consumer believes that the entrant likely
will fail because others are granting exclusives, then it would not require
significant compensation to grant exclusivity as well. Both these reasons flow
from the same point: competition is a p11blic good.

VI.

THE MARKET SHARE THRESHOLD UNDER THE BER

The GVRs provide a block exemption when the market share of the
supplier does not exceed 30%, as discussed in ~89. For exclusive supply
agreements, the block exemption will apply when the buyer's market share
does not exceed 30%, as discussed in ~21 and ~92. Such exemptions (or
"safety zones") are common in governmental guidelines. 27 I will not comment
directly on the determination of the market share levels chosen. Various
guidelines in the United States also have set safe harbors at the 20-30% level.
I want to focus instead on the determination of the relevant market from
which these market shares are calculated. It should be clear from the analysis
set out in tlus short article that the determination of the relevant market is not
a trivial exercise. Vertical restraints involve the analysis of a number of
markets - the market for the input, the market for the output and the market
for related outputs. Distributors might be viewed as providing an input to
manufacturers or as the customers of manufacturers. Shares in more than one
market are relevant to the outcome. Thus, if market shares are to be used as

27. In the United States there are safety zones in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in
the FTC's Health Care Statements 7 & 8, in the DOJ's Intellectual Property Guidelines and
in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines.
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proxies, they would be more useful if they were gauged in b9th the upstream
and downstream markets relevant to a full competitive analysis.
In addition, the proper relevant market depends on the type of
anticompetitive allegation being considered. 1l1e market relevant to a claim
that a vertical restraint will cause prices to rise above the current (prerestraint) level may be different from the one relevant to a claim that a vertical
restraint will prevent prices from falling below the current level. This was
explained in detail in the discussion of lhe Celloplinne Trap. In particular, a
detem1ination that a firm has a low market share in a broad market might be
relevant to restraints that could permit prices to rise in the future. But, it
would not be relevant lo restraints that would raise entry barriers and prevent
post-entry prices from falling.
As a result, the use of antitrust exemptions and safety zones is prone to
error. TI1is is less of a concern if the exemption is applied at the conclusion of
the evaluation, once all the relevant theoretical and factual analysis has been
carried out. At lhal point, however, a safely zone is no longer needed. The
conclusion can be based on all the information, not just the market share level.
When exemptions are used as a short cut lo truncate the evaluation at a
preliminary stage, however, then there is a serious concern that the market
shares will be based on the wrong relevant market. By limiting the evaluation
solely to market share and ignoring entry barriers and other highly probative
evidence, the accuracy of the prediction is further reduced. 28
Exem plions and safety zones are favored because they are said to increase
business' legal certainty, as the GVR's note in ~22. This can be true, but only
if the market definition methodology is not sensitive to the concerns raised in
this article. If lhe enforcement agencies, however, properly tailor the market
definition methodology lo lhe particulars of the allegations, then the business
certainly is lost unless the advisors are able to accurately predict the agencies'
concerns. If business certainty is achieved only by limiting the evaluation to
a single market determination that may or may not be the more probative
market definition, then the business certainty will come at the expense of
accuracy.
For these reasons, I am somewhat skeptical of the value of these
exemptions and safe harbors. In the situations in which it is obvious that no
competitive concerns are raised, a formal exemption is not needed because the
outcome is obvious. In the more difficult situations, the exemption can and
will lead to significant policy errors. Nor will much certainty be achieved.
Businesses need lo hire lawyers and economists to determine the proper
relevant market. TI1e market definition methodology is complex and fact
based, so that it often is difficull lo predict with a high degree of certainty
what the enforcement agency will determine as the relevant market. This

28. The Conm1ission appears aware of these issues but is concerned about making a
"radical d1cmge" and providing a "lower level" of legal certainty. Communication from the
Commission on the application of the Conmmnity competition rules to vertical restraints
(Follow up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints) (Undated), http://europa.eu.int
/comm/competition/ antitrust/ others/.
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point is illustrated by the complexity of the market definition analysis in the
Videoworld example.
To the extent, however, that there is a commitment to using market share
thresholds to define a safe harbor, accuracy can be improved in the following
way. First, the markets should be defined in the context of the particular
anticompetitive concerns raised about the vertical restraints. In particular, the
relevant markets definitions might vary according to whether the relevant
competitive concern involves exclusion or collusion, and whether it involves
achievement of market power or maintenance of pre-existing market power.
Second, market shares should be gauged in both the upstream and
downstream markets. For example, the safe harbor might only apply if the
market shares of the group of restrained and restraining firms both are less
than 30%. Of course, accuracy would be further increased if the analysis
would include evaluation of entry barriers.

